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THE IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA'S ECONOMIC STATECRAFT
The fact is that a thriving America is good for China and a thriving China is good for America.
-Hillary Clinton 1 When the Vice President of the United States, Joseph Biden, returned from his August 2011 visit to China, he provided some candid observations and opinions in a New York Times op-ed piece:
I FIRST visited China in 1979, a few months after our countries normalized relations. China was just beginning to remake its economy, and I was in the first Senate delegation to witness this evolution. Traveling through the country last month, I could see how much China had changed in 32 years -and yet the debate about its remarkable rise remains familiar. Then, as now, there were concerns about what a growing China meant to America and the rest of the world …As I told China's leaders and people, America is a Pacific power and will remain one. But, I remain convinced that a successful China can make our country more prosperous, not less. 2 Vice President Biden's comments after his state visit to China capture the heart of an ongoing discussion that has taken root in the center of current discussions regarding the state of U.S. economic and political dominance in comparison to China. Twenty years after the end of the Cold War and the rise of the U.S. as the world's sole great power, many now view the emergence of China as the most likely contender or threat to balance U.S. power or surpass it. In the midst of an increasingly globalized international environment, and as the U.S. and other western nations currently face serious financial crises, China, among several other nations (including India and Brazil), has one of the fastest growing economies in the world, and holds a significant amount of U.S. public debt. Meanwhile, the U.S. economy appears to have stalled with no clear end in sight out of its current economic recession. For some observers, these factors point to an impending decline in U.S. influence in the Asia-Pacific region and around the globe.
However, as the previous statement by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton suggests, China's rapid economic growth does not automatically signal the coming decline of the U.S. as a great economic power. Rather, since their economies are so interconnected, the economic fortunes of both may rise and fall together. Therefore, China's economic rise does not necessarily spell the demise of the U.S. This paper will examine the strategic and political implications for the U.S. of China as a rising economic power. It will examine economic factors to include growth (as measured in GDP), manufacturing, trade policy, fiscal and monetary policy, finance, and investment to determine China's true economic strength relative to that of the U.S. With a particular focus on the financial and trade dilemmas between the United States and China, can either use the debt and trade issues as leverage against the other? What are the potential pitfalls or benefits? What is the way out? It will also examine current economic forecasts for China in these areas, and provide recommendations for U.S. economic policy toward China for the future. represented the world's most advanced form of capitalism. 4 However, in 2008, the global financial crisis began to take hold and the U.S. economy began to collapse. In the fall of 2008, the U.S. economy contracted by 6 percent and shed almost four million jobs in six months, the largest such decline since the 1930s.
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Suffice it to say, the specific details, events, and actions taken by the U.S. federal government, private industry, and federal and commercial financial institutions to address the contraction of the U.S. economy from 2008 -2010 is fairly well documented in the public information domain and is outside the primary scope of this project.
However, it is worth noting that the recent events of the American financial crisis and the greater global financial crisis have propelled debate of alleged American decline and China's rise to prominence to the forefront of contemporary discussion. Specifically, the recent U.S. recession appears to have contributed to a growing view that China's economy is economically superior to the U.S. According to a recent Gallup poll, 53 percent of Americans consider China to be economically superior to the U.S., while only 33 percent view the U.S. as the top economic power. 6 The Gallup poll says that the idea of Chinese economic dominance has taken hold in the United States only since the start of the U.S. recession in 2008 and that opinions could change when the U.S. starts to recover. 7 Clearly, the recent U.S. economic troubles combined with China's recent rapid economic expansion have influenced perceptions. However, these influences need to be put in perspective.
GDP and Growth
An understanding of the implications of China as a rising economic power cannot begin without first examining key economic factors, foremost among them being the size and growth rate of the U.S. and China's economies as measured by Gross Domestic Product (GDP). GDP represents the total value of all goods and services produced in a country for a specific time period. Although commonly misperceived that China's GDP is larger than that of the U.S., it is not, in fact, the case. As of 2010, the GDP for China is approximately, $5.9T, the second largest in the world, behind that of the U.S., leading at approximately 14.6T, almost two and a half times the size of China's GDP. 8 Despite its recent economic woes, the U.S. distinctly continues to lead as the world's largest economy and has begun a slow and tentative turnaround.
In considering GDP per capita, the U.S. far exceeds China, with per capita equaling $47K, compared to China's GDP per capita of $4.4K. 9 However, GDP growth represents an entirely different matter. China's GDP growth rate was 10.4 percent for 2010, while the U.S. GDP growth rate climbed to three percent after negative growth over the preceding two years. 10 In fact, China has sustained an average annual GDP growth rate over nine percent a year for almost thirty years, the fastest growth rate for any major economy in recorded history. 11 Consistent with this phenomenon and based on current projections, Goldman Sachs has forecasted that China will overtake the U.S. vehicles, and midsize and large cars from the U.S. 24 The new tariffs added almost 22 percent to the import prices, and along with other tariffs and taxes already in place, serve to severely limit sales of the American imports by raising the retail price to
approximately three times what the same cars and sports utility vehicles would sell for in the U.S. 25 For its part, China asserted that the tariff is an -antidumping‖ and -antisubsidy‖ tariff, because the U.S. car companies like Chrysler and General Motors received government aid several years ago during the financial crisis. However, this assertion is not strongly supported because the retail price in China for these vehicles is already higher than what it would be in the U.S., and the tariffs that China applied are much higher than the norm that would be applied on these vehicles in other countries. 26 Interestingly, some argue that it is these types of unfair trade practices that have agreed to accept the organizations broad free trade rules. However, China also negotiated an accession agreement that articulated a plethora of details tailored to the specifics of the economy of China, which at that time was still very much a developing country. 27 The agreement required China to lower its tariffs to lower its tariffs to levels below those of many other developing countries, but compared to most industrialized countries, China was allowed to impose considerably higher tariffs that China still retains even as its economy has risen to the second largest in the world. Few trade officials expected all of the terms of China's accession agreement to last as long as they have, and conditions will inevitably change, in some cases in China's favor and in some cases against China's favor, when China is automatically relabeled as a market economy in 2016. 33 Regardless, there are clear implications for the U.S. as the current President Obama's administration will invariably decide very soon how it chooses to respond to allegations of China's unfair trade practices. The U.S.
response should be synchronized with its overall policy for continued strategic and economic engagement of China. Given that this is a presidential election year, it is fair to say that this response will undoubtedly be informed by the perception of whether China's trade practices negatively impact American jobs now and in the future.
China's Currency Policy and Issues
An integral issue closely tied to the complex trade relationship between the U.S.
and China is China's valuation policy for its monetary currency, the renminbi (RMB).
China's policy of intervention to limit the appreciation of the renminbi against the dollar and other currencies has become a major source of tension with many of its trading partners, especially the United States. 34 Some analysts contend that China deliberately -manipulates‖ its currency in order to gain unfair trade advantages over its trading partners. They further argue that China's undervalued currency has been a major factor in the large annual U.S. trade deficits with China and has contributed to widespread job losses in the United States, especially in manufacturing. 35 As an example, every month, the U.S. buys approximately $35 billion in goods and services from China and sells $11 billion back, leaving a $24 billion trade deficit. Although there is an increased sense of urgency for some on this issue, the jury is still out with regard to whether the currency issue is of as great strategic and national importance as some claim, as some economists, policy makers, legislators, and business leaders contend that it is not as impactful on jobs and the economy as some believe. Some legislators are concerned about increases in consumer prices that might occur from the likes of legislation recently introduced by the Senate, while business leaders argue that it would not create more jobs in the U.S. and distracts attention from more urgent issues, such as market access. 41 The U.S.-China Business Council, a private, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization of roughly 240 American companies that do business with China, does not even identify the currency exchange rate issue in its topten list of economic concerns with China. 42 Also, some analysts contend that, although an appreciation of China's currency could help boost U.S. exports to China, it could also lessen China's need to buy U.S. Treasury securities, which could push up U.S. interest rates at a critical time when the U.S. economy is attempting to recover. 43 In fact, in the medium run, an undervalued RMB neither increases nor decreases aggregate demand in the U.S.; instead, it leads to a compositional shift in U.S. production, away from U.S.
exporters and import-competing firms toward the firms that benefit from Chinese capital flows. Thus, it is expected to have no medium-or long-run effect on aggregate U.S. employment or unemployment. 44 Therefore, the urgency of increasing China's currency exchange rate in order to improve U.S. economic success is not as compelling as some have presented, upon further analysis, and it does not signal U.S. economic decline. In fact, the U.S. government must engage carefully with China in this area to ensure that any significant and sudden appreciation in China's currency exchange rate does not produce negative unintended consequences for the U.S. another on an overnight basis). 46 However, during the recent financial crisis, the Federal
Reserve also purchased longer-term Treasury securities in an effort to spur economic growth. 47 For foreign investors, U.S. Treasury securities offer are an attractive investment because the U.S. has a stable political system, possible favorable returns, and the dollar is considered to be the world's dominant reserve currency. 48 Because of its internal low savings rate, the U.S. depends on countries with high savings rates like
China to invest some of its capital in the U.S. market, which has helped to keep the U.S.
interest rates low and enabled the U.S. to consume more than it produces. 49 As discussed in the previous section, China's central bank is a major purchaser of U.S.
financial assets, largely because of its exchange rate policy. In order to limit the appreciation of the renminbi against the dollar, China must purchase U. Despite holding this small percentage of U.S. federal debt, some U.S.
policymakers have great concern about the growing U.S. dependency on China to purchase U.S. Treasury securities to help fund the U.S. budget deficit. These include concerns that China's large holdings may give it leverage over the U.S. on economic and noneconomic issues, or that China might lose faith in the ability of the U.S. to meet its debt obligations, and, thus, might seek to liquidate its assets or significantly cut back on purchases of new securities, a move some contend could damage the U.S.
economy. 54 Meanwhile, Chinese officials have expressed concerns over the safety of their large holdings of U.S. debt, and some have argued that China should either diversify away from U.S. Treasury securities or implement policies that slow the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, which would lessen the need to buy U.S.
securities. 55 Apparently, China's concern is driven by the Federal Reserve's use of a policy called quantitative easing (QE), which ultimately devalues the U.S. dollar and increases the value of the yuan (renminbi) faster than the Chinese government is comfortable with, leaving China no choice but to eventually stop buying U.S. debt and to reduce its holdings of U.S. securities. agree that a large sell-off of China's U.S. holdings could diminish the value of these securities in international markets, which would lead to large losses on the sale, and would subsequently decrease the value of China's remaining dollar-denominated assets. 57 This would also occur if the value of the dollar were greatly diminished in international currency markets due to China's sell-off. Also, such a move would diminish U.S. demand for Chinese imports, either through a rise in the value of the renminbi against the dollar or a reduction in U.S. economic growth. 58 A sharp reduction of U.S.
imports from China could have a significant impact on China's economy, which heavily depends on exports for its economic growth and is viewed by its government as a vital source of political stability. 59 Accordingly, the Chinese government has an interest in helping the U.S. get back on its economic feet, as the government estimates that it needs to grow at least eight percent annually to avoid excess unemployment and social unrest. 60 Thus, it is clear that while a long-term gradual reduction of U.S. securities
would not necessarily hurt the U.S. and China, a sudden decision to reduce its holdings of U.S. securities would have potentially harmful implications for China's, and by extension, the U.S. economy.
Internal Challenges to China's Continued Economic Rise
As initially discussed, China's economy has shown unprecedented growth since its government initiated market reforms in recent decades. However, China's continued meteoric economic rise is not guaranteed. As the previous discussion up to this point provides a view into just how integrally intertwined the economies of the U.S. and China are, it is also important to examine a few key issues that may potentially challenge China's continued rise as an economic power. These are issues that the Chinese government will have to address if it is to sustain China's continued economic growth, and any hopes of becoming the world's leading economy anytime soon in the 21 st century.
Uneven Economic Growth. As economic modeling has predicted China's continued growth based on current conditions, it become more difficult to predict future economic performance based on future economic inputs. As China's economy evolves from subsistence agriculture to smokestack industries to the latest electronics for consumer devices, it is possible that China's economic growth rates will level out and slow down, returning to rates more like those experienced by comparable countries. 61 The rationale behind this states that as countries grow, growth gets harder; as economies progress up the global value chains from production of simple manufactured goods to increased reliance on the creativity of their citizens to develop new industries, they rise less rapidly. 62 As a comparison, it took South Korea 30 years, from 1960 to 1990, to raise its GDP per capita from one-thirtieth to one-third of U.S. GDP per capita, but it took an additional 20 years to inch from one-third to one-half. 63 Over-reliance on Foreign Trade. Closely related to its currency exchange policy issues, the global economic crisis has demonstrated to the Chinese government the dangers of relying too heavily on exports and fixed investments for economic growth, thus promoting easy credit policies among banks. 64 That dependency made China's economy particularly vulnerable to the effects of the global economic downturn. In the future, these policies might undermine long-term economic stability by causing overproduction in various sectors, increasing the level of non-performing loans held by the banks and boosting inflationary pressures.
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Population and Demographics. It appears that China will eventually have to deal with the effects of a declining birth rate and to a lesser degree, its one-child policy that it implemented in 1979. Population scientist are predicting that, by the mid-21st century more than one-third of China's population will be aged 60 or over and one-quarter of China's population will be aged 65 or over, with more than 100 million people aged 80 or over. 66 This means that less than two young adults will have to support one old person and shows that in a few decades, China's population structure will turn from a pyramid to a pillar shape. 67 The challenge will be in how the Chinese government adapts to this change in demographics, as there are serious implications and costs for providing health care to such a large aged population. The other less visible implication is that China's abundant labor supply will begin to shrink, and that labor pool has been a driving force behind China's economic growth up to this point. 68 Thus, if China's economic growth does not progress beyond reliance on a large labor pool to feed simple manufacturing processes, its government will have significant problems in sustaining its future economic growth.
Social Unrest. Although China's authoritarian political system has harnessed the country's growing economic potential, it has not yet found a way to solve the problem of demands for political participation that tend to accompany rising per capita income, with an expanding urban middle class, regional inequality, rural poverty, and resentment among ethnic minorities. 69 Every year numerous protests occur in China over a number of issues, including pollution, government corruption, and land seizures. A number of protests in China have stemmed from frustrations among many Chinese that they are not benefitting from China's economic reforms and rapid growth, and perceptions that those who are getting rich are doing so because they have connections with government officials. 70 It remains to be seen how China will address these issues in order to sustain its continued economic growth. As Salvatore Babones reflects, it is difficult to imagine a dynamic knowledge economy emerging in a politically repressive one-party state, as not one ever has. 71 
Government Control of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs).
As a relic of its authoritative communist government, SOEs, which account for a significant amount of Chinese industrial production, put a heavy strain on China's economy. By some estimates, over half lose money and must be supported by subsidies, mainly through state banks. 72 Government support of unprofitable SOEs diverts resources away from potentially more efficient and profitable enterprises, and the poor financial condition of many SOEs makes it difficult for the government to reduce trade barriers out of fear that doing so would lead to widespread bankruptcies among many SOEs and unemployment. 73 This is yet another area where a full conversion to a free market would improve economic efficiency and innovation in China's economy.
Pollution. According to the World Health Organization, it is estimated that air pollution in China kills 656,000 people annually and water pollution kills 95,600
annually; China's own Ministry of Water Resources estimates that about 300 million people rely on water that contains harmful substances. 74 Although growing environmental degradation has been recognized as a serious problem by China's central government, it has found it difficult to induce local governments to comply with environmental laws, especially when such officials feel doing so will come at the expense of economic growth. 75 This kind of environmental peril could seriously hamper China's sustained economic growth if the government does not work proactively to address environmental issues in the future.
U.S. Policy Approach to China's Economic Rise
The discussion thus far has highlighted China' s emergence as an economic power, the key economic areas that encompass China's burgeoning economic strength along with how any potential actions by China in those areas could ultimately impact both China and the U.S. positively or negatively, and several important challenges that
China will have to address in order to sustain continued strong economic growth. 79 It is in this forum where the larger issues previously addressed in this paper are discussed by both sides.
While the long-term strategic approach of engagement continues, the current administration has shown willingness in the short-term to file trade cases with the WTO to address current disputes, as highlighted previously in this paper. President Obama Clinton asserted, -the stakes are much too high for us to fail. As we proceed, we will continue to embed our relationship with China in a broader regional framework of security alliances, economic networks, and social connections.‖ 81 The economic prospects of China and the U.S. rise and fall together.
Accordingly, as the leading free market economy, the strategic implications for the U.S.
are that the U.S. should actively continue its long-term strategic approach of engagement to successfully work through its complex economic relationship with China.
The U.S. recognizes that China has a stake in maintaining the international trading system, which is largely responsible for its economic rise, and China should take a more active leadership role in maintaining that system; and further economic and trade reforms are the surest way for China to grow and modernize its economy. 82 Does China's economic rise equal U.S. demise? No -it represents opportunities for engagement, partnership and economic growth for both.
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